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1. Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to present the importance of producer 
groups and cooperative banks in the sustainable development of rural 
areas in Poland. The analysis shows that both producer groups and coop- 
erative banks play a major role in agricultural progress. Yet, in Poland 
the potential of these organizations is not adeąuately utilized because of 
insufficient support and promotion (in the case of the former) and regu- 
lar changes in the law that have often limited their development (in the 
case of the latter). However, the latest data prove that the situation of 
cooperative banks is improving very fast. Thanks to appropriate policy 
and a consolidation process they have retained their market position, de- 
spite being faced by competition from big commercial banks and other 
institutions like Poczta Polska (Polish Post), which recently started to 
provide financial services, and Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo- 
Kredytowe (Cooperative Savings and Credit Bank).
2. The Common Agricultural Policy
Recent changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU 
are aimed at shifting morę money to rural development, which is consis- 
tent with the major rationale for intervention in this sector, i.e. the exis- 
tence of positive externalities and public goods thanks to agricultural 
production. Nevertheless, the vast majority of funds are still spent on 
market support. The EU’s budget totals EUR 116 554 million in appro-
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priations for commitments and EUR 106 300 million in appropriations 
for payments [General budget, 2005, 4]. Table 1 shows slightly different 
numbers, although they are taken from the same document [General 
budget, 2005, 6]. No matter what figures are used in calculations, the 
share of the appropriations for commitments to agriculture and rural de- 
velopment in the EU’s total budget has varied between 42.6% and 43% 
in recent years. In the last decade there have only been smali changes in 
spending on agriculture and rural development. A much faster reduction 
in farm subsidies took place in the previous decade. At the beginning of 
the 90s CAP accounted for about 2/3 of the budget [Fischler, 2004]. It is 
worth noting that the budget itself is not large when compared with 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI). Appro­
priations for payments amount to 1.09% of the total GNI of the member 
States GNI (ESA 95) in 2005.
Table 1. Appropriations for commitments in 2000-2006
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006*
Agriculture 41 738 44 530 46 587 47 378 49 305 51 439 51 587
— excluding rural de- 
velopment 37 352 40 035 41 992 42 680 42 769 44 598 44 610
- rural development 
and supporting mea- 
sures
4 386 4 495 4 595 4 698 6 536 6 841 6 977
Total appropriations 
for commitments 93 792 97 189 100 672 102 145 115 434 119 419 120 876
* at 2005 prices
Source: General budget, 2005, 6.
The biggest achievement of the latest CAP reform passed in 
Luxemburg on 26th June 2003 was the replacement of the standard sys­
tem (support dependent on the level of production) by the introduction of 
Single Farm Payments. As a result the support that distorts trade the 
most will be decreased by 70% and export subsidies by even 75%. Never- 
theless, the level of payments to rural areas is still Iow - only EUR 6 841 
million in 2005, i.e. 13.3% of total expenditure on agriculture within CAP. 
Unfortunately, the positive impact of the Luxemburg reform on the possi- 
bilities for sustainable development in rural areas of Poland will be lim- 
ited. The reduction of payments to large farms (those receiving above 5 
thousand euros of support a year) will rangę from 3% in the year 2005 to 
5% in 2007. A proposal of a 19% reduction for farms receiving above EUR 
50 thousand a year was rejected. Also the reforms of agricultural markets
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will not contribute to sustainable development. Quite the opposite - the 
competitiveness of Polish milk and rye producers may strongly deterio- 
rate. In addition, the preliminary project of reforming the sugar market is 
not good either for sugar factories, usually operating close to rural areas, 
or farmers. Taking into account that a lot of sugar factories have been 
closed in Poland and the unsatisfactory results of accession negotiations 
(Iow A and B quotas), further restriction on the sector will be a threat to 
the sustainable development of agriculture and rural areas in our coun­
try. The same applies to other quotas and limits on agricultural produc- 
tion discussed by Szydło [2004, 219-227]. In the face of integration with 
the EU and liberalization of food markets (WTO talks), both producer 
groups and cooperative banks should play a major role in the integration 
of farmers. Without strong development of both these collective activities, 
fast modernization of the sector and rural areas will not be possible.
3. The situation of Polish agriculture and the need
for setting up producer groups
Polish agriculture still lags behind. Farms and food production in most 
EU countries are at much higher level of development. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the farming sector in Poland is characterized by 
the existence of a large number of farms. According to GUS in 2003 there 
were 1956.1 thousand farms with at least lha of land utilized for agricul­
tural purposes. Structural changes occur very slowly, as in six years 
(1996-2002) the number of farms fell by only 4.4% (90.7 thousand). In 
some countries like Denmark, Belgium, Sweden and Finland the process 
of polarization of farms is faster than in our country, even though the 
structure of their farms is far morę favourable. In the years 1996-2002 
the number of the biggest farms (above 20 ha) increased by 27.6 thou­
sand, that is by about 31%, so in 2002 they accounted for only 6% of all 
farms. In 1999 farms of 20 ha or morę accounted for only 36% of the total 
agricultural area, while in EU-15 it was 78.9% [Poczta, 2000],
Second, only 3.3% of agricultural land belongs to the first and second 
class, however the poorest soil (class V and VI) constitutes 34% of the 
land [Głowacki, 2002, 108], The share of particular classes in the year 
2000 amounted to: 0.4% in class I, 2.9% in class II, 22.7% in class III, 
39.9% in class IV, 22.6% in class V and 11.4% in class VI.
Third, the level of support to agriculture measured by the Producer 
Support Estimate, in which assistance is calculated as a percentage of 
gross agricultural revenue, is much lower than in most OECD countries 
(Table 2).
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Table 2. Producer support estimate (percentage of value of gross farm receipts) in 2003
NZ AU PL USA Mex SK Tur
2.45 4.07 8.72 17.98 18.84 20.86 26.37
HU CZ OECD EU15 Jap Kor Nor CH
26.6 27.47 31.71 37.36 57.63 60.48 72.41 74.07
NZ - New Zeland, AU - Austria, PL - Poland, USA - United States, Mex - Mexico, SK - Slovakia, 
Tur - Turkey, HU - Hungary, CZ - Czech Republic, Jap - Japan, Kor - Korea, Nor - Norway, CH - 
Switzerland
Source: OECD FACTBOOK, 2005.
The reduced competitiveness of Polish farmers may have an adverse 
effect on the possibilities of sustainable development of rural areas. Ac- 
cording to GUS farm income has constantly decreased over the years. 
Along with the fali in income there has been a fali in investment, which 
has caused sharp depreciation of farm machinery. The data clearly show 
that a large majority of producers are too weak to successfully compete 
with strongly subsidized and relatively rich EU farmers. Obviously, the 
promotion of producer groups and cooperative banks could strengthen 
the position of Polish farmers.
Morę and morę agricultural produce is supplied to big, usually multi- 
national, supermarkets. Bielski [2004, 22] States that their share in the 
Polish food market is 25%. In developed countries their market position 
is even stronger. Their share in the retail market varies between 51% in 
Germany to 80% in France and almost 100% in Switzerland [Boguta, 
2001, 51], Therefore, further expansion of supermarkets in Poland is fea- 
sible. As a result the market for agricultural produce from smali and me­
dium sized farms will shrink even further. A farmer has little strength 
to negotiate good contracts with suppliers (e.g. producers of fertilizers) 
and buyers of agricultural produce. As a conseąuence the prices of agri­
cultural produce are increasing much morę slowly than the prices of 
goods and services purchased by farmers (Table 3).
Research carried out by Lemanowicz proved that joining a producer 
group helps to shorten distribution canals and reduce the number of in-
Table 3. Index of price relations (“price gap”) of sold agricultural products to purchased 
goods and services
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
previous year = 100 1995 = 100
96 95.8 91.4 91.5 103 97.5 90.9 70.2
Source: GUS, 2003.
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termediaries in selling goods. Hence, a farmer’s profit margin could sub- 
stantially increase. The share of food processing plants in farmer’s dis- 
tribution canals increased from 44% to 55% after joining a producer 
group. Another positive outcome was a sharp fali in the number of pri- 
vate intermediaries from 27.5% to 12.7% and a decrease in the share of 
Products sold via Street markets — by 4.9 percentage points to 4.1% 
[Lemanowicz, 2004, 109],
Promotion and support of producer groups could reduce the inequality 
between cities and rural areas, as structural changes in farms, such as 
an increase in the acreage of farms, are occurring slowly in Poland. Due 
to high unemployment, excess farm workers cannot find jobs in nearby 
towns and even cities, which leads to severe problems with hidden un­
employment. According to Sokołowska [2002] 20% of farm workers are in 
fact redundant. Other economists estimate the hidden unemployment 
ratę as 1 or even 1.4 million. Official data (registered or the LFS unem­
ployment ratę) do not recognize this issue. Among farmers and their 
families the latter amounted to only 8.7% in the third quarter of 2004, 
while amongst non-farm workers in rural areas it reached 27.5%.
On account of the matters already discussed sharing the costs of ex- 
pensive equipment or other kinds of investment in farms within a pro­
ducer group is a rational response to the needs of farm restructuring. It 
is worth noting that agriculture is one of the most Capital intensive sec- 
tors. To illustrate this point, the cost of maintaining one’s own Bizon 
Rekord combine harvester (costing about 200 thousand zl) is only cost ef- 
fective for farms of at least 100 ha [Bielski, 2004]. Taking into account 
the latest Narodowy Spis Powszechny (National Agricultural Census), 
there were only 7.42 thousand such farms in 2002 (in 1996 the number 
was even lower, 6.6 thousand). As a consequence, collective action may 
benefit all members of a group.
The degree of depreciation of fixed assets in agriculture, hunting and 
forestry is much higher than in the economy as a whole. It amounts to 
62% for buildings and structures, 77.5% for machinery, technical equip- 
ment and tools and as much as 93.5% for transport equipment [Mały 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 2003], At the current level of investment the sus- 
tainable development of agriculture in Poland is not possible (table 3).
The fali in the real interest ratę has not had much influence on the 
level of investment. It is still quite Iow (Table 4), although there seems 
to be some chance of double digit investment growth in the economy as 
a whole in 2005. Some problems in transferring EU funds to Połish 
farmers slightly constrained the predicted boom in agricultural invest- 
ment at the end of 2004. Additionally, the level of prices of fertilizers has 
dramatically increased sińce accession on May lst 2004.
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Table 4. Indices of investment outlays (constant prices) in 1996-2002
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
previous year = 100 1995 = 100 2000 = 100




130 96.5 83.1 102 96.4 89.8 95.6 88 85.8
Source: Mały Rocznik Statystyczny, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004.
4. Legał basis for the functioning of producer groups
The functioning of producer groups in Poland is regulated by the act of 
15th September 2000 on producer groups and their organizations as pub- 
lished in Dziennik Ustaw 2000, No. 88, Item 983 [Dziennik Ustaw, 
2000a] and the act of 29th November 2000 on the organization of the 
markets for fruit and vegetables, hops, tobacco and dry fodder [Dziennik 
Ustaw, 2003b], The former act was amended by the act of 28th November 
2003 [Dziennik Ustaw, 2003c] and the act of 18th June 2004 [Dziennik 
Ustaw, 2004], The former regulation of 15th March 2001 ceased to be 
binding with the coming into force of the regulation of 4th July 2003 on 
the specification of produce and groups of produce, for which producer 
groups can be created, the minimal annual ąuantity of food production 
on the market and the minimal number of members of producer groups 
[Dziennik Ustaw, 2003a],
5. Financial support to producer groups
Support is conditional on being entered into the register by the 
voivode (head of regional government administration). This is an admin- 
istrative decision, so there is the possibility of appeal.
Producer groups that were registered before lst May 2004 are granted 
support from the state budget via ARiMR (Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Agriculture). It amounts to [see www.arimr.gov.pl/docs 
Zedukacja/gpr_umowa.doc]: in the first year - 5%, in the second year - 
4%, in the third year — 3%, in the fourth year — 2%, and in the fifth year 
- 1% of annual net receipts from the sale of produce from the farms be- 
longing to a producer group. Additionally, there are two limits on sup­
port. First, the support cannot be greater than the administrative costs 
of a group. Second, it cannot exceed [see www.arimr.gov.pl/docs/edukacja 
/gpr_umowa.doc]: in the first year - 80- times, in the second - 64-times,
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in the third - 48-times, in the fourth - 32-times, in the fifth - 16-times 
an average monthly wagę without profit payments. The level of wages is 
published by the chairman of GUS (Central Statistical Office). The aver- 
age wagę amounted to 2546.14 zl in the fourth quarter of 2004.
According to the aforementioned act of 15th September 2000 r. (Article 
23) producer groups may receive preferential investment credits. The in- 
terest ratę is set at L of the rediscount ratę (now 6.5%). Thus the cost of 
Capital for producer groups is quite Iow, about 1.6% a year. Payment of 
the debt can be delayed (max. 2 years). The borrowing period cannot ex- 
ceed 8 years. Additionally, maximally 70% of the value of an investment 
project can be financed by credit. There is also a limit for the total credit 
- 16 million for meat and 8 million for other production.
It is worth noting that even farmers not belonging to producer groups 
can buy machinery or land using preferential credit. Low interest credit 
can be granted to young farmers. Relatively low interest rates in Poland 
mean that the cost of Capital is no longer perceived as the most limiting 
factor in the development of farms. It is possible that profitability and 
potential demand for extra produce are morę important. Therefore, the 
sustainable development of agriculture cannot be achieved without 
a good and stable financial perspective.
The results of empirical research carried out by Lemanowicz on 62 
producer groups in Poland show many positive effects of belonging to 
a producer group [Lemanowicz, 2004, 103-115], Farms in these producer 
groups were much morę market orientated than an average Polish farm. 
Their market production totalled 3900 zl/ha in 2002, i.e. almost twice as 
much as on an average farm - 2007 zl in 2002 [GUS 2002]. In the farms 
examined there was an increase in crop acreage for all types of produc­
tion after joining a producer group. This amounted to [Lemanowicz, 
2004, 107]: 18% for fruit and vegetables (average farm area 13 ha), 11% 
for pigs (average area 29 ha), 21% for cows - dairy (average area 29 ha), 
12% for cereal (average area 37 ha), 10% for poultry (average area 11 
ha), 7% for hops (average area 11 ha), 6% for herbs (average area 6 ha). 
Similarly, there was an increase in an both the average size of farm and 
acreage in all these five voivodeships (provinces) (Table 5).
Unfortunately, the number of producer groups is still very low. De- 
spite the elear advantages of joining a producer group farmers are still 
reluctant to participate. Lack of promotion and a low level of support are 
to blame for this situation. At the beginning of 2002 there were only 7 
registered producer groups, 50 morę were waiting for registration 
[Papuga 2002, 17], Since then little progress has been madę. In July 
2004 only 76 producer groups with 12 377 members were operating (less 
than 1% of farms that applied for direct payments - see Table 6).
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Table 5. The change of farm area after joining a producer group
Province Average size of farm (ha)








Table 6. Specification of producer groups in Poland (31st July 2004)







Fruit 4 98 Poultry 5 68
Fruit and vegetables 13 205 Milk 2 36
Fruit and vegetables 
for Processing 2 451 Cattle 1 5
Vegetables 3 33 Sheep 1 53
Potatoes 1 29 Pigs 10 1 062
Sugar beet 1 23 Rabbits 1 12
Cereal 18 430 Herbs 1 16
Tobacco 9 9 766 Flowers 1 9
Hops 2 73
Total 76 12 377
Eggs 1 8
Source: MRiRW (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development).
Since the end of July 2004 there has been only a smali increase in the 
number of producer groups. The latest data of May 2005 show that there 
are 105 producer groups uniting 17 thousand farmers and operating ac- 
cording to the act of 15th September 2000 on producer groups and their 
organizations. In addition, there are 38 preliminarily recognised pro­
ducer groups and their organizations and 22 producer groups of fruit 
and vegetables established in accordance with the aforementioned act of 
15th September 2000.
Unfortunately, there is only a smali chance that support from the 
EAGGF Guarantee Section from Plan Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich (De- 
velopment Plan for Rural Areas), Działanie (activity) 7 will prompt 
a sharp increase in the number of producer groups. In the years
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2004-2006 the budget for such activities amounts to EUR 25.4 million, 
80% of which, i.e. EUR 20.2 million comes from the EU. Nevertheless, 
producer groups that were set up before lst May 2004 cannot benefit 
from the programme. Moreover, the maximum limit of support is not 
high enough (although higher in the case of “new” producer groups). In 
the first and second year assistance to producer groups set up after ac- 
cession cannot exceed EUR 100 thousand, in the third - EUR 80 thou- 
sand, in the fourth - EUR 60 thousand and in the fifth — EUR 50 thou­
sand a group. Taking the data on producer groups discussed above and 
the average turnover generated (3900 zl/ha), the optimum acreage of 
a group that will enable to receive all payments will be 3076.9 ha and 
the optimal turnover EUR 3 million.
According to “Plan Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich na lata 2004-2006” 
(the Development Plan for Rural Areas) support can be granted for set- 
ting up and the administrative costs of producer groups for the first five 
years of their existence. Unfortunately, funding is only transferred to 
the groups 60 months after receiving entry into the register. In practice, 
in the opinion of Zofia Szalczyk, a producer group will receive help one 
and a half years after establishment at the earliest. During this period 
farmers have to spend their own funds. In conseąuence only 20 groups 
filed an application for support [Komisja Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi 
No. 264, 25.05.2005],
6. Cooperative banks and their influence 
on sustainable development
Cooperative banks are regulated by The Cooperative Banks, Affilia- 
tion and Affiliating Banks Act dated 7.12.2000 and amended 27.06.2003 
[Dziennik Ustaw, 2000b] and The Bank Law dated 29.08.1997 [Dziennik 
Ustaw, 1997] with later amendments. Due to these regulations, there 
are some major differences between cooperative banks and other, com- 
mercial banks that have the form of a joint stock company.
First, the Capital requirements for cooperative banks are much lower 
than for other banks. The level of funds that a cooperative bank affili- 
ated to an affiliating bank is required to hołd is set at EUR 300 thou­
sand. By the end of 2005 these funds must increase to EUR 500 thou­
sand and to EUR 1 million by the end of 2010. The finał Capital 
threshold, however, was relaxed by EU despite objections from coopera- 
tive banks.
Second, decisions in cooperative banks are reached by a simple major - 
ity of votes, irrespective of the share of Capital owned by a person or
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a group. In joint stock companies, on the other hand, it is the amount of 
share Capital that counts. Thus, the decisions madę by a cooperative 
bank are usually morę balanced than those madę by a commercial bank 
which aims mostly to increase the level of profit from invested Capital.
Third, shares in a cooperative bank cannot be sold to a third person in 
the secondary market (shares can only be cancelled). As a result short 
term investment — speculation (as in the case of joint stock companies or 
limited liability companies) is not possible.
Because of these differences, the shareholders of cooperative banks 
are not so interested in increasing the Capital of a bank, as they can only 
benefit from dividends. Paying excessively high dividends, in turn, could 
constrain investment in new banking products like e-banking. Therefore, 
the growth of Capital should be a result of an increase in the number of 
members and retention of profit. Because of these regulations, there 
could be mounting pressure to increase dividends. However, the mem- 
bership of many Polish cooperative banks is dispersed so that members 
do not have much influence on bank managers. Hence, there is a differ- 
ent kind of danger — inadeąuate supervision (the case of Dolnośląski 
Bank Regionalny and Bank Spółdzielczego Rzemiosła). DBR’s initial loss 
of 12,5 million zł turned out to be much higher. After audit it was shown 
to exceed 90 million zl [Pokojska, 2004, 14],
Another characteristic feature of cooperative banks is their local char- 
acter that contributes to the sustainable development of Polish agricul- 
ture and rural areas. Their functioning is limited to a powiat (adminis- 
trative unit - there are 308 powiats in Poland, they are the medium 
level of the 3 levels of local and regional government) in which a bank 
has its headąuarters and to the powiats in which it had agencies at the 
time when the act of 7th December 2000 came into force. This act enables 
to increase the rangę of functioning to neighboring powiats with the con- 
sent of the bank that associates smaller cooperative banks. The specific 
legał regulations mean that cooperative banks are inherently orientated 
towards sustainable development. Members and workers of co-operative 
banks are usually strongly linked to local communities.
In the process of reforming Polish cooperative banking a two-tier 
structure was created. There are now three cooperative banks that asso- 
ciate smaller banks. Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej S.A. (BGŻ) that had 
the function of being a central bank for co-operative banks is no longer 
in this structure and is now a joint stock company. Yet, many coopera- 
tive banks still have some shares in BGŻ. After years of painful restruc- 
turing (the number of banks fell from 1653 in 1993 to 1295 in 1997 and 
to 597 in 2004) the financial situation of cooperative banks has much im- 
proved. To meet the obligation set by the first two Capital thresholds
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a lot of banks had to be taken over. In the futurę further takeovers will 
take place as morę than half of these banks (57%) have not yet reached 
the third threshold (Table 7).









less than 100 50 7.4 — —
100-200 55 8.1 — —
200-300 44 6.5 — —
300-400 187 27.5 16 2.7
400-500 90 13.2 56 9.4
500-600 60 8.8 63 10.6
600-700 39 5.7 67 11.2
700-800 36 5.3 55 9.2
800-900 29 4.3 51 8.6
900-1000 21 3.1 35 5.9
>1000 69 10.1 253 42.4
PLN/EUR exchange ratę of 29 December 2000
Source: Sytuacja finansowa, 2004, 70.
Despite growing competition co-operative banks have not lost their 
market share. Quite the opposite, they have managed to slightly 
strengthen their position. But still their strength is limited, especially in 
comparison to foreign banks. Cooperative banks own only 5.3% of the 
banking sector, while commercial banks which have a majority of foreign 
capital own as much as 67.8% (Table 8).
In the years 1997-2003 the assets of cooperatives banks morę than 
doubled (from 11.3 bln zl to 25.7 bln zl.). Surprisingly, the dynamics of 
growth in commercial banks was lower (an increase from 236.4 bln to 
463.6 bln zl).
The expansion of co-operative banks is elear when analyzing the 
changes in the number of employees - growth from 25.7 thousand in 
2000 to 27.4 thousand in September 2004, while in contrast there was 
a fali in employment by morę than 20 thousand (to 121.7 thousand) in 
commercial banks. Correspondingly, the number of outlets of cooperative 
banks inereased from 2.7 to 3.3 thousand, whereas in commercial banks 
this number fell from 11.5 to 8.5 thousand.
7 — Urban...
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Table 8. Structure of ownership of the banking sector in Poland
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Commercial banks 95.5 95.7 95.8 95.8 95.4 95 94.7
1.1. With majority of State Capital 49.3 45.9 23.9 22.9 23.5 25.1 24.2
1.2. With majority of private Capital 46.2 49.8 71.8 72.9 71.9 69.9 70.3
a) Polish 30.9 33.2 24.6 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.5
b) Foreign 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 68.7 67.4 67.8
Cooperative banks 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.6 5 5.3
Source: NBP (Polish National Bank).
Morę evidence for the recovery of the sector analyzed is given by the 
profit and loss account. The aggregate net profits for the three biggest 
and at the same time affiliating banks, i.e. Bank Polskiej Spółdzielczości, 
Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski and Mazowiecki Bank Regionalny, 
amounted to 127 million zl in 2004. But still the net profits in commer- 
cial banks was even greater. For example PKO BP had profits of 1 514.4 
million zl, Bank Pekao 1 343 million zl, Bank BPH 788.3 million zl, and 
BZ WBK 444.5 million zl. These differences only results from size differ- 
ences, as Capital adequacy is similar in both commercial and cooperative 
banks.
7. Conclusions
One possible solution to the problem of the Iow number of producer 
groups in Poland is an increase in support granted to such groups, espe- 
cially in the first quarters or even months of functioning when they face 
their biggest difficulties. The European Parliament recognises the need 
for greater support and in one of its resolutions urges the European 
Commission to double assistance to producer groups in the new member 
States [Komisja Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi, No. 263, 19.05.2005]. It is also 
necessary to equalize the level of assistance given to producer groups 
that were set up before and after May lst 2004. At the moment producer 
groups that were established before accession receive much less support. 
Hence, unification in this area is vital. However, it will not be easy be- 
cause “old” producer groups already receive support in the form of pref- 
erential credit. This support should cease when a group wishes to come 
under EU regulations. Another obstacle to progress is farmers’ aversion 
to collective action. According to Roman Sass, farmers find it difficult to 
choose a leader from among themselves [Komisja Rolnictwa i Rozwoju 
Wsi, No. 264, 25.05.2005]. On the other hand, in most cases they cannot
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afford to hire a professional manager. Government agencies like ARiMR 
(the Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture) and 
CDRs (Agricultural Advisory Centres) should concentrate morę on the 
promotion of producer groups. Selection and training of local leaders is 
also of much importance, as it will contribute to higher utilization of 
Leader+ (one of four initiatives financed by EU structural funds aiming 
to assist rural actors to consider the long-term potential of their local re­
gion).
In the years of slowdown in the economy from 2000 to 2003 coopera- 
tive banks performed better than the much bigger commercial banks. 
Cooperative banks provide services for over 10 million customers. Mem- 
bers and customers of cooperative banks are mainly individuals and 
smali and medium sized enterprises. Four banks, i.e. Bank Polskiej 
Spółdzielczości, Mazowiecki Bank Regionalny, Gospodarczy Bank Wiel­
kopolski and BGŻ accounted for about 86% of credit given to farmers 
[Top Agrar Polska, 2005, 16], Affiliating banks seem to be well prepared 
for futurę challenges. GBW SA was third in the ranking “Best banks 
2005” published by “Gazeta Bankowa” (category: “Specialized banks - 
smaller”). Ali these data prove that cooperative banks will continue to 
play a big role in sustainable development in Polish rural areas and 
there is no need for big changes in either the organization or functioning 
of cooperative banks in the foreseeable futurę.
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